A Comparison of Comparative Economic Anthropologies

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I  Introduction

During the 1960's a great debate erupted in economic anthropology between schools of thought identified respectively as "substantivist" and "formalist." The former, based directly on the ideas of Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957), emphasizes the "embeddedness" of "primitive" economies within the broader cultural context of their societies. The latter argues that "rational" economic behavior is universal, transcending cultural contexts even in primitive economies, and thus standard neoclassical economic theory is the appropriate method of analysis for all economies and societies.

This debate can be viewed as similar in content and implications to the debate between "old" and "new" institutionalists regarding how to analyze modern economies (Mayhew 1989), which can be viewed as a updated version of the nineteenth century Methodenstreit between the German Historical School and the Austrian School. Also it is deeply entangled in arguments regarding the fundamental nature of such primitive and more generally, traditional economic systems.

The encounter between the European colonizers and the indigenous peoples of the Americas stimulated the idea of the inferiority and "savagery" of "primitive" peoples, as Christian missionaries strove to "civilize" the conquered natives. Reflecting this view in one of the earliest efforts at a "science of society" was Hobbes (1651, 188) who argued that the life of early peoples was "brutal, nasty, and short." During the early and mid-twentieth century many economic anthropologists were effectively the flunkies of colonial administrators, aiding them in the suppression and domination of their subjects of study (Lodewijks, 1992, 13-14).

In contrast, Rousseau (1762) promulgated the idea of an original paradise before the formation of states when complete equality and harmony reigned in the state of nature. His influence led French thinkers to describe the Native American Indians as "Noble Savages," an attitude that has tended to persist in France to the present. 2 Morgan (1877) presented such a view of the Iroquois peoples of the Northeast US, his vision leading Engels (1884) to argue that the original condition of humanity was "primitive communism."

We shall examine this difference of views by considering various schools of comparative economic anthropology that have developed over time and their interrelationships and mutual influences. Broadly speaking these divide along substantivist-formalist lines as noted above, but with many lying somewhere in-between and themselves riven by debate over the fundamental split.

We identify seven primary schools, recognizing that some of these have combined to create new syntheses of analysis. Our seven primary schools are substantivism, particularism, formalism, evolutionism, Marxism, structuralism, and cultural ecologism. An important synthetic school is structural Marxism. After discussing the origins, tenets, and interrelationships between these approaches, we shall reconsider and re-evaluate the main debate.

II  The Substantivist View of the Traditional Economy

Polanyi defined the substantivist position in (1957) as studying the "empirical economy" which is an "instituted process between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfying means." 3 He contrasted it with a "formal" approach that assumes universal rational action, which he identified with the view of Robbins (1932). He foreshadowed
the argument in his classic *The Great Transformation* (1944, Chap. 4), defining the traditional economy in substantive terms according to its "embeddedness" within a larger social and cultural context. He distinguished three categories of the traditional economy which are laid out below, although in (1957) he would define the three economic systems as reciprocal, redistributive, and market, thereby collapsing the first two together. One of his most important and controversial arguments was that predominantly non-traditional market economies did not truly emerge until the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century.

A Household Economy

Among "pre-capitalist" economies initially recognized by Polanyi, one is the essentially self-sufficient household economy, also labeled the "domestic mode of production" by some observers (Sahlins, 1972) and the "moral economy" by still others (Cheal, 1989). This is the world of idealized complete sharing and equality existing within closely knit family groups. This is the pure version of the traditional economy, perhaps coinciding with primitive communism. An example corresponding to this model may well be the Khoi-San (also known as !Kung Bushmen) peoples of Southern Africa. Even so they practice reciprocal exchange with Khoi-San outside the immediate family and actual market exchange with ethnic outsiders such as the Bantu. Thus there is probably no example of the pure version of this type.

Holding to the criterion that an economic system is categorized by the decisionmaking system that determines the largest amount of the production and distribution activities in the economy, then this is still quite a widespread type given the significant amount of production for non-marketed family use that occurs even in many highly developed economies (possibly as high as 25% of GDP in the US). It is the emphasis on treating economic institutions as if they are family units that is the most important mechanism by which traditional elements enter into modern developed economies such as that of Japan.

B Reciprocal Economy

A second type is the reciprocal economy. In such an economy exchanges take the form of gifts, either of goods or of labor services, that are later reciprocated. Polanyi argued that such an economy operates on the principle of symmetry between the groups making reciprocal exchanges. Although usually the initial recipient reciprocates, sometimes this can be carried out by another party through a complex chain of established relationships. The most famous such economy is that of the Trobriand Islanders, studied initially by Malinowski (1922). Probably the most discussed aspect of the Trobriand Islands economy is the "Kula" trade. This is a ceremonial exercise where villagers from one island visit another island and present gifts to partners with whom they have well-established relationships. Malinowski argued that the Trobriand Islanders clearly distinguish the Kula trade from regular barter (market) trade, identifying the latter by a separate term, "gimnali."

Although there has been a tendency by many observers to romanticize reciprocal economies, we must note that they can have quite negative aspects. Mauss argued in *The Gift* (1925) that there are three overwhelming obligations in a reciprocal society: to give, to receive, and to reciprocate. To fail to do any of the three is to suffer a loss of face, possible serious social ostracism, or worse. Thus Colson (1974, 47-49) reports observing among the Gwembe Tonga of Zaire a woman giving free grain to a visiting distant relative and learning later that the donor feared being a victim of witchcraft if she did not do so.

The threat of loss of face can lead to intense and destructive gift giving of a competitive nature. Such apparently was the case in the late 1800's among the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island who would hold "potlatches" during which they would give each other large quantities of gifts (Boas, 1897). Those who gave the most became dominant socially. Eventually the potlatches involved the destruction of goods and even warfare with other tribes in order to obtain goods to
give as gifts. Although this does not correspond with "Noble Savage" behavior, it has been argued by Pidcocke (1974) that these extremes only emerged after contact with Europeans and that prior to that the potlatch performed a redistributive function to help those temporarily in need.

Sahlins (1972) has argued that there are three types of reciprocity. The first is "general" which corresponds to the sharing discussed above for the household economy. It occurs among close kin and may not involve any balance. Those better-off take care of those worse-off, possibly on a permanent basis. The second is "balanced" which would be like the Kula trade of the Trobriand Islanders. Giving implies that one will receive an equivalent gift back. Those involved are not the closest of kin, but usually have established and reasonably friendly relations. The third is "negative" and implies a malevolent hostility between the parties who are trying to get the best of each other. Extreme forms of this include such things as theft or wartime pillage.

C Redistributive Economy

The third of Polanyi's types of traditional economies is redistributive. He argues that this depends on the principle of "centricity," the existence of an individual or organization that receives transfers of goods from others and redistributes them in some manner. Polanyi argues that such systems are more likely to occur in more developed economies than those in which we see reciprocity or simple householding. He distinguishes "primitive" from "archaic" economies, the latter generally practicing sedentary agriculture and more likely to be redistributive.

In their simplest form such systems depend on a chief or "Big Man" who does the redistributing. Harris (1979, 92-95) argues that a necessary condition for such a system is the production of a foodstuff that can be stored for redistribution, such as grains, rather than one that rots, such as yams. Initially the transfers to the chief are voluntary and the redistributions benefit those less fortunate as among the ancient Celts. But as the economy becomes more developed the voluntary nature of the transfers to the center decreases and more of what is transferred is kept for the use and aggrandizement of the Big Man. Eventually this process leads to the emergence of true states, formal taxation, and unequal socio-economic classes.

III Particularism

At the extreme substantivist end of the substantivist-formalist spectrum is the particularist school. They actually predated the substantivists, having been founded by Franz Boas (1897). Indeed they tend to be pure anthropologists rather than economic anthropologists or pure economists, even of the old institutionalist school. Their position is that there are no universal historical or economic generalizations, laws, or methods of analysis. Each individual culture must be studied in and for itself without any preconceptions or irrelevant analytical apparatus. The preferred approach is total immersion in order to discover the particularity and uniqueness of the society being studied, the essential approach of the field anthropologist.

Particularism can be contrasted with its close relative, substantivism, in that the latter may allow for some historical and systemic generalizations, such as Polanyi's idea that economies might move from household sharing through reciprocity and redistribution to market exchange. Although pure particularism weakened as formalism and other schools emerged, seeking general patterns across societies, and perhaps also as truly primitive cultures have disappeared, it is worth remembering the kernel of truth in particularism—ultimately every society is unique.

IV Formalism

The formalist school of thought argues that all societies and economies can be viewed as market economies, irrespective of how agents may view the nature of transactions within their own society. This is probably the original view of behavior in primitive economies by economists prior to the development of anthropology as a discipline. It is exemplified by the famous assertion of Adam Smith (1776, Book 1, Chap. II, Paragraphs 1 and 2) that:
"The division of labour...is not originally the effect of any human wisdom.... It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature, which has in view no such extensive utility: the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature...; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to enquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals."

The universality of market behavior was argued by Robbins (1932, Chap. 1) when he described economics as the study of the universal problem of "human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Thus it is argued that scarcity is a universal phenomenon and that all societies must make hard choices between competing ends however they mask the mechanism of such decision-making. Supply and demand forces will operate and cut through all situations and structures. In essence, then, formalism is the application of the neoclassical method of economic analysis to all societies and situations.

Within economic anthropology itself the now-identified "formalist" school asserted itself in response to Polanyi's defining them in 1957 and arguing the inferiority of their approach relative to his own substantivist-institutionalism. Polanyi and his allies, such as Dalton (1961, 1962), were charged with prejudicially promulgating an "obsolete anti-market mentality" (Cook 1966; LeClair and Schneider, 1974).

More specific formalist arguments include noting the many primitive societies such as the Kapauku of New Guinea (Pospisil, 1963) who appear to engage in overt and intense market practices. Also it is argued that such apparently reciprocal exchange practices as the Kula trade of the Trobriand Islanders simply involve a delayed form of barter exchange. Finally, a more sophisticated argument is that even where practices seem to be driven by some cultural or religious rule or structure rather than obvious market forces per se, the individuals involved are still maximizing utility subject to budget constraints because following the cultural practices are clearly a part of their utility functions. Furthermore, those very practices may have developed in response to underlying economic forces, an argument that is echoed by the Marxists and the cultural ecologists.

One argument used by formalists in arguing for the presence of market forces is the use of money in transactions in most primitive economies. However, despite the arguments of some theoretical Marxists, nearly all actually existing command socialisms of the twentieth century have also used money for distributing goods but with prices and quantities set by the central planners. A strict formalist would have a hard time arguing that such are market economies, unless formalism becomes an empty term insofar as it is asserted that all economies are actually market economies irrespective of their surface arrangements. Of course strict formalists can argue that even in such economies supply and demand forces operate, even if not through centrally set prices or quantities.

V Evolutionism

Darwin (1859) developed the theory of evolution and directly applied it to the evolution of the human species as well. His arguments immediately became very influential in the study of human societies. The Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer that argued that one should not help the poor because then one would be interfering with the operation of the principle of "the survival of the fittest" necessary for evolution to proceed became the most notorious such application (Rosser, 1992). This view of evolution has been applied in a formalist manner in standard economics to discuss interfirm competition and the process of technological change (Alchian, 1950).

In the views of both Darwin and Spencer there is a single path of evolution leading from primitive society to the most advanced of modern societies, viewed by them as being Victorian
Britain. This was the idea of a unilineal path of evolution that influenced Morgan (1877) in his study of the Iroquois peoples, also adopted by Engels (1884), and leading to the formulation of various "stages of history" that all peoples were posited as having to go through on the evolutionary path. The evolutionary approach to distributional systems has sometimes argued that household sharing is the earliest stage (generalized reciprocity), gift-giving (balanced reciprocity) is the next stage, out of which barter transactions evolve, and eventually full-blown market exchange using money, a view in accord with some interpretations of Polanyian substantivism.

This unilineal view has been seriously questioned by most modern analysts. One reason is that ethnographic studies have demonstrated too great a variety of societal forms and historical paths for the unilineal path to be universal. Especially significant has been the ability of some much less developed societies to change dramatically in relatively short periods of time to very different conditions, thereby apparently skipping over "intermediate" stages that they were supposed to go through according to the unilineal perspective.

Nevertheless the evolutionary perspective remains very influential. There is considerable evidence that reciprocal exchange is more frequently observed in the less rather than more developed economies (Pryor, 1977). Indeed in his econometric study of 60 primitive and peasant economies, Pryor (op. cit.) found the level of economic development to be the variable most frequently showing up as a statistically significant correlate of various aspects of those economies.

Thus it is not surprising that substantivists and formalists have battled for the mantle of evolutionism. It is not only because Polanyi supported a stages of history view that the main group of old institutionalist economists calls itself the Association for Evolutionary Economics. Veblen (1898) in particular emphasized an evolutionary approach which is seen as the appropriate way to view the interaction of culture and economy, especially when the latter is embedded within the former.

In contrast, not only are there many neoclassical economists such as Alchian arguing that the "survival of the fittest" is the very essence of neoclassical economics, but formalist anthropologists have recently begun to use the concept of "evolutionarily stable equilibria" (Hawkes, 1993) in their analysis. This concept was developed by the ecological theorist Maynard Smith (1982) and is based on game theoretic Nash equilibria. It has since enjoyed popularity among many economists as well. Thus evolutionism is claimed by both sides in the great debate of economic anthropology.

VI Marxism

Orthodox Marxism has viewed the least developed traditional economies as being "primitive communisms." In the unilineal view that Marx and Engels followed much of the time these were succeeded historically by ancient slavery, then by feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism in succession.11 At other times they admitted the alternate possibility of an "Asiatic mode of production" in which a state bureaucracy suppressed the class struggle and thereby the dialectic of history (Marx, 1894, Part I). At the end of their lives they fell under the spell of Morgan and adopted his evolutionist schema and had from much earlier praised Darwin and his theory highly.

More modern Marxist theorists have emphasized the idea of dependency theory in which the encounter between modern capitalism and traditional economic systems leads to the subjection of the latter by the former in an imperialistic core/periphery relationship (Frank, 1975).12 A dualistic economy is established in which both systems coexist, but with the traditional one dominated and eventually destroyed as it is progressively penetrated by the metropolitan market economy.13

In the French tradition the Marxist analysis of this relationship merged with structuralism in Structural Marxism (Suret-Canale, 1958; Godelier, 1966). Thus the dependency relationship is seen as manifesting itself in a set of deep structural patterns in the society and culture. These
structures tend to take a dialectical form with the class conflicts predominating in the determination of the form of the structures.

Marxist economic anthropology can also be seen as split by the substantivist/formalist debate. Polanyi (1968) identified Marx with the "societal" approach that sees economies as functioning within a broader socio-political context. However "economistic" Marxists have long focused upon the famous Marxist argument that the mode of production is the base upon which the superstructure of culture is erected. But then it can be responded that the mode of production depends not only on the forces of production which depend on technology, but also on the relations of production which clearly depend on social classes.

VII Structuralism

The founder of structuralism was Levi-Strauss (1963). But we must see this approach as having deeper roots in the French tradition of sociology and anthropology, arguably dating from Rousseau. Durkheim (1915) argued that societies possess a collective conscience. This collective conscience possesses an organic solidarity the separation from which explains individual alienation. Durkheim's immediate successor was Mauss whose analysis of reciprocity (1925) strongly influenced Levi-Strauss. Both Mauss and Levi-Strauss argued that reciprocal exchange is universal. However they tended to emphasize psychological and mythic elements rather than economic or historical ones, thus putting them closer to the substantivist camp even if their search for universals has a formalistic air. The structures of exchange are deeply rooted patterns reflecting "oppositions" between the self and the other, an idea also found in existentialism. The latter element opened the door for the structural Marxists with their dialectical methodology. Structuralism has also influenced more recent intellectual trends in French intellectual life such as semiotics and postmodernism. Especially important here is the idea that exchanges represent "messages" which contain mythic and psychologically significant material.

Levi-Strauss is especially famous for his analysis of marriage systems as exchange systems between groups of men, respectively identifying themselves by these exchanges as "self" and "other." These structures are often quite complicated and may be rather disconnected from economic aspects. Indeed structuralism has been criticized for tending to seek out the most complicated explanations for social phenomena, explanations not usually empirically testable.

All of this has led to a declining influence of strict structuralism in economic anthropology. However structural Marxism has many adherents and its influence lives on as well as in the more recent postmodernist school. Whereas the strict structuralism of Levi-Strauss was focused almost entirely on culture and thus essentially substantivist, structural Marxism has more strongly emphasized economic factors and is thus more open to formalistic elements, although in much the same way that Marxism in general is.

VIII Cultural Ecologism

The most recent development in the analysis of traditional economies has been the cultural ecologism approach, also labeled cultural materialism by Harris (1979). This school claims to transcend the old split between formalism and substantivism, although there is probably a tilt in the direction of formalism. Formalism is followed by arguing that culture is driven by economic realities that ultimately reflect the underlying ecological conditions in which the society resides. On the other hand substantivism is given its due in that a culture can persist historically into a different environment from where it originated as an autonomous force upon the behavioral rules of the economic system.

Cultural ecologism in the form of cultural materialism can be contrasted with Marxism (historical or dialectical materialism). Both see culture as derived from the material base of society. But whereas Marxism sees this as depending on the class relations arising from the mode of production in a dialectical manner, the ecologists eschew dialectics and emphasize the Malthusian
pressure of population upon food supplies as determining the material base. The source of food depends upon the ecological system which thus becomes the ultimate material base.

A classic example is Harris's explanation of why Jews and Moslems forbid the eating of pork whereas Christians do not do so. Both Biblical and Qur'anic injunctions against the eating of pork are framed in terms of the alleged "uncleanliness" of pigs. But pigs are clean animals when they are not penned up. The Jewish Talmudist Maimonides argued that it was a health argument, derived from the propensity of pigs to carry trichomonosis. But then cattle carry the much more dangerous anthrax and chickens carry salmonella. Furthermore the injunction is in Leviticus, a section of the Bible that many Christian fundamentalists follow. Why then do most ignore this particular injunction while it is taken seriously in Orthodox Judaism and in Islam?

Harris (1974) argues that it has to do with the desert ecology of the Middle East in which Judaism and Islam initially developed and prospered. Christianity originated there also but came to prosper in Europe rather than the Middle East. The natural food of pigs is nuts from trees. Forests of trees only exist where precipitation exceeds transpiration in relatively wet climates. To raise a pig in a desert one would have to feed it hard-to-grow grain. But cattle, sheep, camels, and goats can all graze on grasses in desert areas that grow where crops cannot be grown. Thus pigs are relatively ecologically inefficient in deserts and tend to be produced and consumed in wetter environments such as Europe and China.

The cultural ecological approach presumes at least part of the formalist view by assuming that in the face of Malthusian pressures on food supplies societies attempt to optimize. Major evolutionary changes in the human economy are then posited to result from crises in food production. Thus the rise of sedentary agriculture came after the extinction of many species of megafauna due to overhunting (Cohen 1977). Key to this argument is the claim that hunter-gatherers understand how plants grow, they just felt no pressure to control their growth until the overhunting crisis happened. The widespread reciprocity and egalitarianism of hunter-gatherers in turn reflects the advantages to hunting of fairly small wandering family groups who share in the hunt.

More broadly the cultural ecological approach attempts to explain numerous social phenomena from kinship patterns to attitudes towards warfare and continues to have a great deal of influence. Its greatest critics have tended to be substantivists such as Sahlin who argue that it is overly simplistic and unicausal in its explanations. This criticism is almost certainly right. On the other hand cultural ecological has had an impressive record of explaining quite a few phenomena that had defied explanation in the past.

IX The Substantivist/Formalist Methodenstreit Redux

In the debate between formalism and substantivism there is no clear resolution. In a sense the lack of ultimate resolution can be seen by noting that there is no definitive yes or no on Polanyi's argument that European feudalism was a traditional economy rather than a market economy, much less on the much-debated status of the ancient Greek economy.

Unsurprisingly much of this lack of resolution results from a lack of agreement on appropriate criteria for judgment, as well as actual disagreement about facts, especially when dealing with ancient or primitive economies. Is an economy to be categorized by whether a particular form or practice characterizes the majority of material production, or whether one should accord a special significance to the production of certain particular items? Thus Polanyi's argument that no economy was truly a market economy prior to the industrial revolution depends on the former criterion, that not until then was a majority of material production actually traded in reasonably free markets. A contrasting view holds that if goods crucial to social control and dominance are so traded, copper and tin in the Bronze Age for example (Frank, 1993), then markets for them crucially determine social and political outcomes and structures and thus are the central dominating feature of such an economy.
The mixed nature of the evidence can be seen by contemplating a controversial econometric study of subjective data on 60 primitive and peasant economies carried out by Pryor (1977). As noted above he found strongest support for evolutionism which as we have already argued can be consistent with either substantivism or formalism. He also found explicit support for substantivism because of the apparent significance of the polygyny social variable in influencing a number of economic behaviors. Evidence for cultural ecologism came in that the nature of the food supply showed up as significant for some variables. He saw support for formalism in that most of the societies had some markets, even if they were very limited, and that factor markets seemed to be correlated with factor supplies.

Ultimately the issue really is methodological and philosophical. Going back to the 1941 exchange between Herskovits and Knight we find a conflict between induction and deduction. Formalists simply assume that all behavior must be rational and follow deductively from the axioms of the neoclassical model. Any apparent deviations are to be interpreted so as to fit into the straitjacket of the model no matter how much they must be distorted in order to do so. The substantivist position is "empirical," as Polanyi noted. Following Herskovits, one should look at the facts on the ground and induce from there. If the facts deny the assumed theory then the theory is what must be changed, not the facts.

X Conclusion

Primitive/traditional economies exercise a fascination for modern societies because of our sense that they reveal our true natures. In fact they reveal a wide variety of forms and patterns. There is a greater tendency for household sharing and reciprocal exchanges to occur among such societies, but the social context of such behaviors may imply unpleasantness such as in someone engaging in such behavior out of fear of another one casting a magic curse on them.

We have reconsidered the debate regarding how to analyze such economies. On the one hand the substantivists and their close allies the particularists have argued that such economies must be analyzed on their own terms and that they generally exhibit a strong role for social and cultural factors which embed economic decisionmaking within themselves. At the other extreme are the formalists who see economic decisionmaking in all societies as rational optimization, even in primitive and peasant economies. Ultimately this involves denying the validity of the concept of the "traditional economy." In between in different positions lie the evolutionist, Marxist, structuralist, and cultural ecologist schools with most of them containing internal debates over the conflict. Resolution of these debates remains difficult because of fundamental disagreements over what are the appropriate criteria for judgment as well as over the facts.

We conclude by reminding the reader of the element of truth in the particularist critique. Outside observers can never truly understand traditional economies and societies and should be cautious about making generalizations regarding them. Ultimately they retain their air of mystery.
Notes

1. This term refers strictly to the level of technology mostly used in the economy. Primitive and "traditional" are not identical, the latter term meaning for Polanyi any economy embedded within the broader cultural context. Thus it may be possible to have "new traditional" economies, ones with modern technology, but such an embedding within a traditional religion as in the case of Islamic economies such as Iran's (Rosser and Rosser 1996, Chaps. 5, 16).

2. This view cuts across ideological lines in France. Leftist revolutionary followers of Rousseau followed it, including modern structural Marxists (Godet 1978), as well as reactionary royalist romantics such as Chateaubriand whose novels did much to popularize the image of the "Noble Savage" of North America.

3. Neale and Mayhew (1983) show the deep links between Polanyi's substantivism and the old institutional economics, these links working in both directions.

4. Arguably his arguments were foreshadowed by Horkovits (1941) in an exchange with Knight (1941) in which the latter criticized the former's earlier work on economic anthropology for being too heavily influenced by "institutional economists" such as Veblen and for allegedly failing to apply the "universal principles of economy." Horkovits responded by criticizing the idea of "homo economicus" and by defending an empirical approach recognizing individual and societal variety.

5. Of course the formalists argue that intra-family relations can be analyzed using standard neoclassical economics (Becker, 1981). An example of this applied to the Khoi-San is Hawkes (1993).

6. Lack of balance in such sharing situations has been labeled "tolerated theft" by Blanton Jones (1984).

7. Pryor (1977, Chap. 4) argues that sometimes groups believe that they practice balanced reciprocity when a careful accounting of their gift giving shows that they do not; some individuals are permanent net givers and others are permanent takers. This may happen when a group believes that they have balanced reciprocity. Their belief leads them not to account too closely their mutual balances, whereas in a hostile trade situation they will be accounting very carefully ironically leading to a more balanced outcome.

8. In principle, old economic institutionalism carried to its logical conclusion is consistent with particularism. However its most prominent practitioners such as Veblen, Commons, and Ayres all searched for some kinds of generalizations.

9. Although many identify Smith as the ultimate fountainhead of formalism, Polanyi did not do so, even while admitting the influence in that direction of some of his remarks. In (1968) he distinguished between the "societal" approach, clearly analogous to substantivism, and the "economic" approach, analogous to formalism. He placed Smith in the former along with Montesquieu, Quesnay, Carey, List, and Marx. The founders of the latter were Townsend, Malthus, and especially Ricardo, according to him. The distinction between the two was their view as to whether the economy is embedded in the society or independent.

10. Mayhew (1980) has documented instances of blatant misunderstanding and misuse of standard economics concepts by some formalist anthropologists. One is tempted to wisecrack that if many economists suffer from "physics envy," then perhaps many anthropologists suffer from "economics envy."

11. The initial framework of this schema was laid out in Marx and Engels (1848), without the "primitive communism" stage.

12. Frank (1993) has more recently criticized Polanyi by arguing that there was a "world system" in the ancient world dominated by the definitely functioning markets at the core of the system.

13. Dualistic models have been popular in standard economic development theory. Lewis (1954) contrasted the traditional sector marked by average product distribution within families with the competing market sector with its marginal product distribution system.

14. In French, "conscience" means both what in English are called "conscience" and "consciousness." Durkheim used the term to mean both, as in society's collective consciousness determining its norms, that is its conscience.

15. Bossard (1965, 1970) emphasizes the role of food pressures on agricultural societies in determining both social structures and the nature of technology.

16. Some Christian sects are vegetarian (e.g. Seventh Day Adventists). But the Ethiopian Orthodox are the only one to ban just pork consumption, aside from some that consider themselves to be actually Jewish, although the Russian Orthodox in Russia abjure eating pork specifically during Lent.
17. Diener and Robkin (1978) criticize this argument on the grounds that for the Jews pigs were simply one of a larger set of forbidden animals and that the Islamic proscription resulted from their urban base and a desire to control farmers. 

18. For a discussion of how this assumption has turned into a belief in much of economic analysis, see Rosser (1993).

References


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