In the latter part of the nineteenth century a number of significant events paved the way for the reception and subsequent development of marginalist economic theory in Italy. Economic societies had been formed, most notably the Società Adamo Smith in Florence in 1874; pioneering works on economics were being undertaken by the likes of Francesco Ferrara and Angelo Messedaglia; journals were established to disseminate pure economic theory and advocate ‘liberal’ public policy propositions, such as the Giornale degli Economisti, which was founded in 1875; and classic foreign works on economics were being translated into Italian and published by the Biblioteca dell’economistà from 1850.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the golden age of Italian marginalism had already dawned. Maffeo Pantaleoni had published his Principii di Economia Pura (1889), which succeeded in clarifying and popularising the marginalist approach to economics in many parts of Italy, and Vilfredo Pareto and Enrico Barone had written several seminal pieces in the Giornale degli Economisti on equilibrium and welfare theory in the mid- to late-1890s. Pareto’s Cours d’Économie Politique (1896-97 [1971]) was also very influential, especially in Italy. In addition, the Italian tradition in public finance had modified and extended marginalist economic concepts to undertake fiscal analysis which, in today’s terms, would be considered a curious combination of welfare analysis and public choice. This fiscal tradition thrived under the leadership of Antonio De Viti de Marco, Ugo Mazzola and Pantaleoni, all editors of the Giornale degli Economisti.

When Pareto’s Manuale di Economia was first published in Milan in 1906, it was therefore received by a community of economists who were well versed in marginalism. Importantly, the book’s impact on Italian intellectual life was immediate and significant, with important reviews written in Italy and the UK. It was translated into French by Alfred Bonnet, approved by Pareto, and published with a new and extended mathematical appendix in 1909 as the Manuel d’Économie Politique. This edition was reviewed in the United States and Europe. A second edition of the Manuel d’Économie Politique appeared posthumously in 1927, correcting typographical errors in the first French edition. The long-awaited English-language Manual of Political Economy was published in 1971. It was a translation from the second edition of the Manuel prepared by Ann Schwier. Henceforth, reference to the Manuale indicates the Italian edition, the Manuel the French editions and the Manual the English translation.

The Manuale is significant for four main contributions: the formulation of choice theory with reference to an (imperfect) ordinal specification of utility; the inclusion of an appendix which advanced formalism in economics by, among other things, igniting debate on what is now referred to as the path-dependence of utility; the re-specification of general equilibrium theory in terms of tastes and obstacles, and the related treatment of economic maximisation under different ‘types’ of
economic conditions; and the investigation of the logic of various human actions and identification of the consequent implications for methodology, economic theory and the social sciences.

The genesis of choice theory based on ordinal preferences is evident from Pareto’s footnote on the first page of the book’s mathematical appendix:

The notions of indifference lines and of preference lines were introduced to science by Professor F.Y. Edgeworth. He started with the notion of utility (ophelimity), which he assumed to be a known quantity, and from it deduced the definition of these lines. We have inverted the problem. We have shown that by starting with the notion of indifference lines, a notion given directly by experience, we can arrive at the determination of economic equilibrium and work back to certain functions, among which will be ophelimity, if it exists. In any case, indices of ophelimity can be deduced. (Pareto 1906 [1974], p. 367)

The Manuale, or perhaps the more internationally read Manuel, is now well recognised for its pioneering and seminal contribution to ordinal utility theory. In this regard, the early literature on ordinalism by Hicks and Allen (1934), Lange (1934) and Hicks (1939) all referred extensively to the Manuel. Great works almost invariably contain imperfections, and Pareto’s great economic work is no exception. Most curiously, ordinalist indexes of systems of utility were set up but cardinal restrictions were also imposed on indifference curves – most notably in the extended appendix to the Manuel. The initial commentary in the 1930s English-language literature on ordinalism not only pointed to the contributions of the Manuel, but also to the incompleteness of Pareto’s ordinal system and the associated inconsistencies. Later commentaries (Samuelson 1974; Weber 2001) openly suggested that Pareto’s discussion in the Manuel was confused.

In fact, Pareto’s first work on this subject predates the Manuale by six years. In ‘Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un nuovo trattato di economia pura’ (1900), Pareto applied an ordinal transformation function to a cardinal utility function, expressed pure economic equilibrium as a system of equations where utility is based on preference ordering, and highlighted the equivalence of the equilibrium result for both cardinal and ordinal specifications of utility. Curiously, the ‘Sunto’ is superior to both the Manuale and Manuel in one very significant respect: the text of the article contains a flawless literal exposition of an ordinal equilibrium system and the appended ‘analytical solution to the problem’ contains a near-flawless mathematical formalisation of an ordinalist system, with just one cardinal condition retained (McLure 2005). However, complexities associated with the greater range of additional issues addressed in Pareto’s post-‘Sunto’ studies contributed to a diminution of his emphasis on ordinalism in economic theory.

In this regard, it is relevant that the mathematical formalisation of the Manuale was undertaken in the context of two goods and then generalised for the n-good case on the presumption that the price of a good, say x, is a function of the quantity consumed of x alone. This was justified on the basis that it eliminates the complexities that arise when the utility of x changes with variations in the consumption of other goods. In short, Pareto was deliberately setting aside the issue of path-dependence of utility and restricting pure economic theory to the case where utility is path-independent. However, in his influential review of the Manuale, Vito Volterra (1906) re-opened the question of path-dependence by suggesting that the case of three goods or more requires further consideration. Pareto, in a somewhat atypical manner, welcomed Volterra’s critical assessment.
and responded enthusiastically with the article ‘L’ophelimità nei cicli non chiusi’ (Pareto 1906). This article subsequently provided the basis for extending the 38-page appendix to the *Manuale* to about 100 pages for the appendix to the *Manuel*. In the new appendix, an objective index of utility was developed from an arbitrary function of marginal utility (determined from observed ratios of marginal utility) and the consequences for this index were investigated for a circular consumption path from an initial arbitrary point that returns to that point. Pareto used the term ‘closed circle’ when marginal utility at the initial coordinates for a point in commodity space is unchanged following a circular consumption path (path-independent) and the term ‘open circle’ when a circular consumption path results in a change in marginal utility at the initial coordinates (path-dependent). He correctly found that an index of utility could be developed when marginal utility is a closed circle (although he did not associate this with the formal conditions of integrability) and not when it is an open circle, unless a specific consumption path is imposed.

This examination of path-dependence, in conjunction with work on indexes of utility in the *Manuel*, resulted in a reduction in the clarity of exposition pertaining to the ordinal and cardinal attributes of utility theory. The earlier and somewhat simpler appendix to the *Manuale* considered index numbers (*I*) in two distinct contexts: one, as a function (*Φ*) of consumer goods on the basis that utility is a quantity (cardinal function); and the other, as a function (*Ψ*) of consumer goods when indifference curves are determined from direct observation. In this context, it is usually clear when ordinal analysis is set aside and the index of utility reverts to an affine transformation of utility as a cardinal quantity. For example, section 13 of the appendix to the *Manuale* is headed ‘Characteristics of Indifference Curves Deduced from Ophelimity Curves’ and commences ‘Now we do the inverse of the previous operation: we assume that ophelimity is known *I* = *Φ’ (Pareto 1906 [1974] p. 375). The analysis that follows is undertaken on an essentially cardinal basis. However, in the extended appendix to the *Manuel*, contextual clarity on the different use of index numbers is diminished, or even lost, when accommodating the additional and extensive discussions of utility in open and closed circles or considering the implications of this for experimental economics. As a result, in the new appendix it is sometimes unclear whether indices are ordinal or affine transformations of utility as a cardinal quantity.

The *Manuale* (and the *Manuel*) also re-specified economic equilibrium as a general theory of transformations. Specifically, Walras’s economic functions of exchange, production and capital formation are absorbed within a more general formulation where equilibrium is considered as the balance between an individual’s ‘tastes’ and ‘obstacles’. Tastes are defined by the individual’s choices and obstacles are represented by the costs of transforming goods in response to tastes, either through exchange or the production process. Economic transformations are not just physical, they also occur in space and in time, although Pareto’s pure economics largely sets aside transformations in time. The general equilibrium between tastes and obstacles is then considered for three types of phenomena: Type I, where individuals act economically to realise a direct benefit with market conditions determined by voluntary pursuit of direct tastes without strategic interaction; Type II, where individuals act to increase the indirect benefits from their actions through strategic behaviour that modifies the conditions of the market; and Type III, concerning collectivist action intended to maximise a given notion of welfare (for example, a socialist state).
The consequent general equilibrium analysis proved important for the development of welfare economics. Pareto’s analysis of Types I and II phenomena dealt with what we now refer to as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. The Type I phenomenon yields an economic maximum for perfect competition, whereas the Type II phenomenon does not yield an economic maximum. Kirman (1987, p. 806) has highlighted the originality of Pareto’s analysis of the Type II phenomenon because it explicitly recognised actions to influence prices and examined equilibrium in the context of what is now termed monopolistic competition, well before the 1960s when monopolistic competition was being formally integrated within a general equilibrium framework. The investigation of the Type III phenomenon in the *Manuale* contains aspects of the second fundamental welfare theorem. As in his earlier *Cours d’Économie Politique* (1896-97), Pareto concluded that a socially planned distribution of income can achieve an economic maximum when production is efficiently coordinated by the ‘ministry of production’. While his analysis of the Types I and III phenomena were not comprehensive by modern standards, Pareto was still able to conclude that pure economics does not give us a truly decisive criterion for choosing between an organisation of society based on private property and a socialist organisation’ (1906, p. 257). Many of the analytical gaps in Pareto’s study of the Type III phenomenon in the *Manuale* were filled two years later by Enrico Barone in his ‘Il ministro della produzione nello stato collettivista’ (1908).

Of course, Pareto’s work on welfare economics did not commence with the *Manuale*. He had already specified his efficiency criterion in ‘Il massimo di utilità dato dalla libera concorrenza’ (Pareto 1894); took steps towards formalising the first and second fundamental welfare theorems in his *Cours d’Économie Politique* (1896-97); and, in response to criticisms by the mathematician Gaetano Scorza, wrote ‘Di un nuovo errore nello interpretare le teoria dell’economia matematica’ (Pareto 1902), which provided economics with its first, analytically sound, first-order demonstration of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics.

Nevertheless, the *Manuale* also occupies a very important place in the history of welfare theory. For example, Gérard Debreu explained his decision to list the *Manuale* as one of the five most important economics books of the twentieth century entirely in terms of its treatment of concepts pertaining to optimal allocations: ‘Pareto….studied many of those concepts in several of his writings (and perceived that an allocation is Pareto optimal if, and only if, it is in equilibrium with respect to the price system). Notable among those writings, from the present point of view, is Pareto’s *Manuale’* (Debreu 2001, p. 291).

The Edgeworth, or Edgeworth-Bowley, box was first introduced to economics in the *Manuale* (1906 [1974], p. 138 and p. 250). The appendix to the French *Manuel* also contains an explanation of the mathematical representation of optimality conditions ‘from an economic point of view’. Specifically, the welfare loss from maintaining equilibrium under circumstances of the Type II phenomenon is valued ‘economically’ in terms of the quantity of the *numeraire* good that individuals would have to give up if, on commencing from an initial position of equilibrium determined under the Type I phenomenon (that is, free competition), welfare was progressively reduced to a level that is isohedonous with the Type II equilibrium. Maurice Allais (1985) termed this an ‘equivalent surplus’, which was the starting point for his own important contribution to general equilibrium and welfare based on the related, but analytically superior, notion of ‘distributable surplus’. It is also relevant that the combination of welfare analysis and partial
ordinal presentation of utility theory included in the *Manuel* and *Manuel* was a major source of inspiration for John Hicks in developing his New Welfare Economics (Hicks and Allen 1934; Hicks 1939).

In Italy, the appearance of the *Manuale* was also important for providing a demarcation between what may be loosely called the Pareto school and other approaches to economics followed in Italy which were also grounded in marginalism. In this regard, Guido Sensini’s (1906) favourable review for the *Riforma Sociale* is of some historical importance. Specifically, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Pareto’s close friend and one of the editors of the *Giornale degli Economisti*, considered that the review was acritical, with equations cited just copied down from the *Manuale* without understanding or insight. This provided the basis for a dispute between Pantaleoni and Sensini (Magnani 2005), which culminated in an environment in which criticism of the Paretian concept of science was largely undertaken indirectly: through criticisms of Pareto’s followers and not directly though critical reviews of Pareto’s work. The most celebrated case is Pasquale Jannaccone’s contentious ‘Paretaio’ (1912), which criticised Enrico Barone, Luigi Amoroso and Pasquale Boninsegni for following Pareto too closely, and savagely attacked the work of Guido Sensini. *Paretaio* is Italian for ‘bird trap’, and the name of the article is a pun to illustrate that many of Pareto’s followers have been so completely captured by his approach to science that they simply parrot his ideas and, often, his words: the accusation of plagiarism was levelled directly at Sensini. Pantaleoni subsequently made a similar point in his obituary for Pareto, where he observed that Pareto had the ‘bad luck of creating Epigoni who only repeat his words’ (Pantaleoni 1924, p. 590).

Such comments and criticisms were, to a considerable extent, an implicit attack on the general approach to economics being advocated in the *Manuale*. In his preface, Pareto emphasised that the mode of enquiry of the *Manuale* was so fundamentally different from the *Cours*; it is as if his *Cours* was written by a different author. The difference was not just due to modification of theory, such as the absorption of the notion of capital with transformations of economic goods in space and in time, or the suggestions that empirical determination of indifference curves in choice theory could permit the determination of equilibrium without direct reference to price. More fundamentally, the preface was about the errors in the *Cours* pertaining to the benefits from domestic and international economic liberty, which, by the time that Pareto came to draft the *Manuale*, he regarded as the product of deductions that exceeded the scope of scientific economics. This assessment of his *Cours* was an implicit broadside against all economics that relies too heavily on deduction from the hedonistic postulate. Pantaleoni, however, remained firmly within the hedonistic camp, and the direction of economics being advanced by Pareto placed Pantaleoni in an awkward position (Magnani 2005).

Some of Italy’s emerging and talented younger economists also took a similar position. Umberto Ricci (1933), for example, was strongly of the view that Pareto’s great economic work was his *Cours*, not the subsequent *Manuale*. In short, the hedonistic basis of marginalist economics was already deeply rooted in Italy, so, while Pareto’s attempt to limit the scope of economics in the *Manuale* and ground economic theory in the fact of choice was admired for its originality, it was not universally adopted or supported. Criticism of Pareto’s followers was symptomatic of the disquiet that some Italian economists had for the experimental choice approach to economics being advanced in the *Manuale*.
Of course, not all critics refrained from direct engagement with Pareto. The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1906) reviewed the *Manuale* for *La Critica*. He gave most attention to the two introductory chapters, namely the chapters on ‘general principles’ and ‘introduction to social sciences’. In this regard, the *Manuale* may be unique among major contributions to neoclassical economics for devoting the first quarter of the book, or over 100 pages, to an extensive investigation of the logic of actions pertaining to the economic phenomenon that are beyond the scope of pure economic theory (but are the subject of the social sciences generally). The outcome was a provocatively narrow specification of pure economics – one that considered repeated and logical actions to procure things that satisfy tastes. To facilitate this approach, Croce distinguished between non-logical action (or non-repeated actions motivated by feelings but which are not ‘illogical’) and logical action, and Pareto’s theory of action came to define the relationship between his approach to choice and his economic and sociological theories of equilibrium.

Croce criticised the positive foundation of the *Manuale* by pointing out that this book is full of concepts. Nevertheless, he welcomed Pareto’s reduction in the scope of pure economics because it isolated economic theory to a self-contained whole, and made room for the introduction of a complementary ‘economic philosophy’, with economic science being a combination of economic theory and economic philosophy. In his letter to Croce about this review, Pareto indicated that he had expected a disapproving assessment because ‘we are at two opposite poles, we even speak different languages’ (Pareto 1890-1923 [1975], p. 562). He acknowledged his use of concepts, but defended this on the basis that it is only to indicate ‘real things’, which he suggested was very different from the way Croce wanted concepts, and subtle metaphysics, to be utilised in economic science.

These first chapters of the *Manuale* had a significant impact on many Italian economists. Some adopted the methodological approach developed in the book when considering equilibrium economics and its relationship to sociology and social science generally. For example, Benvenuto Griziotti recalled that ‘The *Manuale di Economia Politica* placed before me the seductive horizon that was the integration of sociology into economics’ (Griziotti 1950, p. 340). Interestingly, Griziotti and others such as Mauro Faziani were not drawn to the treatment of ‘social equilibrium’ subsequently developed by Pareto in his *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (1916). For such economists, the *Manuale* was regarded as Pareto’s greatest work because its general framework for investigating social and economic phenomena was more suggestive, and less prescriptive, than the framework advanced in his *Sociologia*. Other economists who followed Pareto and had a similar interest in the influence of social and political phenomena on economic outcomes, such as Gino Borgatta and Guido Sensini, were also subsequently strongly influenced by the general theory of social equilibrium that Pareto developed in his *Sociologia*.

Outside of Italy, the *Manuale* was reviewed by Philip Wicksteed (1906) for the *Economic Journal*, who warned readers that instead of confronting the conventional language pertaining to exchange and bargaining, they will have to consider ‘ascending hills of pleasure’ by a ‘path’ to a ‘point’ prescribed by ‘obstacles’. Because of the degree of abstraction he anticipated that the book would be understood by few, but went on to conclude that ‘everyone who understands it will be influenced by it’ (Wicksteed 1906 [1999], p. 64). In confessing that he may not have fully grasped and assimilated Pareto’s novel and concentrated treatment of
economics, Wicksteed conveyed a largely instinctive understanding of the originality of the *Manuale* which was usually pertinent, although on one major issue his instinct obscured an important feature of the book. Specifically, while he fully appreciated the restrictive consequences of Pareto’s narrow definition of logical action, Wicksteed did not consider this an intended outcome: he instead saw the definition as having to be stretched to address the economic phenomenon. However, the restrictive definition was no oversight. Pareto deliberately narrowed the scope of action treated by pure economics to the case of path-independent utility, leaving the study of actions where utility is significantly path-dependent to sociology.

The other two major international reviews concerned the *Manuel*. Edwin Bidwell Wilson (1912) wrote a generally appreciative review for the *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society* and Knut Wicksell (1913) wrote a rather critical review for *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung* to counter the ‘repeated suggestions made by Pareto himself and his Italian admirers, that he has accomplished no less than revolution in our science’ (Wicksell 1913 [1999], p. 88).

Wilson’s review was intended for mathematicians, and provided a strong endorsement of Pareto’s use of mathematics in economics, including the use of index functions, and his approach to the social sciences, with particular praise accorded to the introduction to social science and the study of the concrete economic phenomenon. Curiously, though, Wilson was of the view that Pareto’s work in response to Volterra’s claims can be set aside because, in static theory, the time element is set aside: ‘we are inclined to think that the whole discussion of the order of integration, a point that naturally occurs to mathematicians, can be thrown out of court by economists’ (Wilson 1912 [1999], p. 70).

Wicksell’s review is of some importance for two reasons. First, it provided independent and external confirmation of Pareto’s status in Italy as an economic theorist. Second, it presented a strongly dissenting view on the significance of the *Manuel*, finding that ‘most of the truths stated by this gifted economist are not new….while what is really new is, unfortunately, to a great extent, not true’ (Wicksell 1913 [1999], p. 88). His focus is primarily on the mathematical appendix. Wicksell raised concerns with Pareto’s discussion of: utility in open and closed circles (as too complex, unnecessary and incomplete); economic maximisation (expressing a concern with the use of language and the treatment of infinitesimal variations); production theory (critical of the failure to include capital in production theory); and the critique of Ricardo’s principle of comparative costs. On each of these issues, Wicksell highlights some limitations and weaknesses of Pareto’s analysis. However, his assessment does not address some of the fundamental contributions which define the *Manuel* as a book of great historical importance. In particular, the significance of choice theory is largely ignored, with indifference curves only mentioned in passing to indicate that they are used extensively in the book. Similarly, Pareto’s contribution to the methodology of science is overlooked, with Wicksell even suggesting that the first two chapters of the book could be sacrificed, as they are ‘taken up with sociological considerations with little bearing on the real core of the book’ (Wicksell 1913 [1999], p. 78).

In 1968 Mark Blaug suggested that Pareto’s great work remains ‘the most famous untranslated book in economics’ (Blaug 1968, p. 589). That situation appeared to have been rectified in 1971 with the publication of the *Manual of Political Economy*. However, in his important review of the book, William Jaffé
(1972) concluded that, unfortunately, the Manuale remains the most famous untranslated book in economics. His severe criticisms were largely based on the view that the wrong book was translated. Pareto could write well (exceptionally well when he chose) in both Italian and French. However, he did not consider himself a competent translator, and Alfred Bonnet was engaged to translate the Manuale for Giard and Brière. Jaffé was critical of the quality of Bonnet’s French translation, and cites a letter from Pareto to Pantaleoni written when he was correcting the proofs of the Manuel in 1908, in which he reproached himself for the ‘stupidity’ of permitting Bonnet to translate the book (Pareto 1890-1923 [1960], p. 117). To make his case, Jaffé cites perfectly intelligible Italian-language extracts from the Manuale which make little sense in the Schwier-translated Manual. She worked from Bonnet’s ‘wretched’ translation, which did not make sense either. A second significant concern with the English translation was the exclusion of the ‘Foreword’ to the Italian Manuel, which provides great insight into the development of Pareto’s ideas. Again, this is because the ‘Foreword’ was excluded from the French edition.

While Jaffé quite correctly pointed to the many significant difficulties that readers of the Manual will face, it should be recognised that publication of the Manuel was authorised by Pareto himself. Giovanni Busino, the editor of Pareto’s complete works, indicated that, from a ‘philological’ perspective, Schwier had translated the correct text (Busino 1974, p. 324). In addition, the Manuel proved influential in the dissemination of Pareto’s work across the English-speaking world (Schwier and Schwier 1974) and it was the American Economic Association that commissioned the English translation from the Manuel (Tarascio 1974, p. 94).

To mark the centenary of the Manuel, a marvellous ‘critical’ edition of the book has been prepared by Aldo Montesano, Alberto Zanni and Luigino Bruni (Pareto 1906 [2006]). This variorum edition contains the Italian text of the Manuale, together with an Italian translation of the amended paragraphs from the Manuel added in square brackets, and is complemented by extensive and insightful notes and comments by the editors. Furthermore, Italian-language versions of the appendices from both the Manuale and the Manuel are included. The editors are giving consideration to having this ‘critical edition’ translated into English. This would be a most agreeable way to mark the centenary of Pareto’s magnum opus in the field of economics, not just for the benefits associated with reading English text translated from the clearer Italian text, but also for the inclusion of the important ‘Foreword’ and ‘Appendix’ from the Manuale which, by any criteria, remain ‘untranslated’.

An Australian Postscript

It is probably appropriate to conclude by noting that the Manuel contains reference to recent ‘Australian’ legislation as a concrete illustration of the way that governments act to provide ‘privileges’ to entrepreneurs and workers from one economic sector, at the expense of entrepreneurs and workers in the other economic sectors and the consumers generally (which results from the loss of equivalent surplus):

A concrete example of the possibility of an accord between entrepreneurs and workers at the expense of consumers is furnished by a recent law in Australia. The manufacturers of agricultural machinery have obtained a prohibitive tariff directed against the importation of
American machinery, but with the condition that if they do not pay ‘fair and reasonable’1 wages to their workers they must pay, on the products of their manufacture, half the duty imposed by the customs. It must be noted that these laws are efficacious only insofar as they create privileges. If they were general, the consumers being then identical with the producers, the result would be a nominal rise in prices. It is true that there would be a period in which creditors and annuitants would be despoiled, but afterwards there would be a return almost to the original equilibrium. (Pareto 1909 [1971], p. 363)

This example was included in the Manuel, not the Manuale, because the Australian Excise Tariff (Agricultural Machinery) Act was only passed by Parliament in 1906 and became law from 1 January 1907. Nevertheless, it is amazing that, from the other side of the world, Pareto managed to develop an essentially public choice interpretation of an Act being passed in Australia which provided the statutory basis for a landmark court case that legally formalised the prevailing sentiment on wage justice in Australia and which proved very influential in wages policy in the first half of the twentieth century.2

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Notes
1 The 1971 translation of Pareto’s 1909 text indicates ‘equitable and reasonable’, but the legislation Pareto was referring to used the phrase ‘fair and reasonable’.
2 As all students of Australian economic history know, a test case brought by Sunshine Harvesters was presented to Justice Henry Bourne Higgins, who determined that ‘fair and reasonable’ wages should provide for ‘reasonable conditions of human existence’, whereby a man, his wife and three children are maintained in ‘frugal comfort’, with additional wage increments added in recognition of higher levels of skill.

References


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